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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~ 5 ~ . 
September 29, 1986 Conference 




Salerno and Cafaro 
(kept in pretrial 
detention) 
Cert to: CA2 (Kearse, Newman, 
Feinberg [dis.]) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Un~ d States challenges CA2 decision that 
Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is facially uncon-
stitutional. 
- ~ -
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The Bail Reform Act of 
~ 18 u.s.c. (Supp. II) §3141 _e_t_._s_e_q~., revised the federal 
law governing pretrial release of criminal suspects. Under 
§3142(e) of the Act, if a judicial officer "finds that no condi-
tion or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community," the officer "shall order the detention 
of the person prior to trial." Upon the government's request, 
the j ud ic ial officer must hold a pretrial de tent ion hearing in 
cases involving crimes of violence, offenses that may result in a 
sentence of life imprisonment or death, serious drug-related 
crimes, and felonies committed by persons previously convicted of 
serious crimes. §3142(f) (1). Section 3142(f) of the Act speci-
v 
fies a series of procedural safeguards. 'rhe per son resisting 
detention may request the presence of legal counsel at the hear-
ing, may testify and present witnesses, may cross-examine other 
witnesses, and may present evidence by proffer. The j ud ic ial 
officer must take into account specific factors, including the 
nature and seriousness of the charges against the suspect, the 
weight of the evidence, the history and character is tics of the 
person, and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any other 
person or the community that would be posed by the suspect' s 
release. §3142 (g). The judicial officer's findings that no 
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of other persons and 
the community must be "supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence," §3142(f), and the detention order must include written 
- .:S -
findings of fact and a statement of reasons for the detention, 
§3142(i). 
Salerno, t~e reputed leader of the Genovese organized crime ..---
fa~ , and Cafaro, a reputed "captain" in the organization, were 
--, 
charged with various racketeering offenses and violent er imes, 
including two murder conspiracies. The government sought pretri-
al detention of resps pursuant to §3142(e) and the<c (s.D.N.Y., 
Walker, J.) \....--held an evidentiary hearing. The government submit-
ted evidence that resps were engaged in a continuing course of 
illegal and violent activity and that no conditions of release 
would prevent resps from 
pend ency of their trial. 
resuming those activities during the 
The ~ agreed. It characterized the 
government's evidence against resps as "overwhelming," and stated 
that the activities of a criminal organization such as the Geno-
vese family would not cease with the release of its principals 
"on even the most stringent of bail conditions." "The illegal 
businesses, in place for many years, require constant at tent i.on 
and protection, or they will fail. Under these circumstances, 
this court recognizes a strong incentive on the part of [the 
criminal enterprise's] leadership to continue business as usual. 
When business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, 
the present danger such people pose to the community is self-
evident." Pet. App. 56a-57a. Resp's trial was assigned to Judge 
Lowe (S.D.N.Y.), who reviewed and upheld Judge Walker's detention 
order./ 
✓cA2 rever sed. The court agreed that the evidence preferred 
by the government amply supported the DC's finding that the re-
• 
- q -
lease of resps posed a danger to the community. Nevertheless, a -------.. 
majority of the court concluded that "the Due Process Clause / 
prohibits pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the com-
munity." Pet. App. 14a. 
----__/ 
Pretrial detention may be validly imposed when substantial 
evidence indicates that a defendant might flee or might threaten 
potential witnesses, jurors, or others involved in the judicial 
process. "Pretrial detention to avoid undue risks of flight or 
jeopardy to the trial process (is] not prohibited by a constitu-
tional scheme that relies on a trial process to determine guilt 
and enforce the er iminal law." Pet. App. 19a (quoting United 
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002 (Newman, J. concur-
ring)). Pretrial detention on the sole basis that defendants 
would carry out violent "business as usual" is, however, com-
pletely different. There is certainly a compelling state inter-
est in maintaining public safety. But the system of criminal 
justice contemplated by the Due Process Clause is that people 
will be accountable "for what they have done, not for what they 
may do. The Due Process Clause reflects the constitutional im-
perative that incarceration to protect society from criminals may 
be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past 
crimes and not as regulation of those feared likely to commit 
future crimes." Pet. App. 17a (quoting Melendez-Carrion) (empha-
sis in original omitted). 
The Due Process Clause would clearly prohibit incarcerating 
a person not even accused of a er ime in order to prevent his 
future crimes, and would bar preventive detention of a person who , 
- ::> -
has been convicted of past er imes and has served his sentence. 
It must equally bar detention of a person not convicted but only 
accused of a crime. Detention of persons arrested for criminal 
conduct is unconstitutional "not because preventing crime is less 
important than preventing a defendant's flight," Pet. App. 20a, 
but because that particular means of preventing crime violates 
substantive due process, regardless of any particular procedural 
due process protections in the Act. The proper governmental 
response in a case of suspected dangerousness is surveillance of 
the suspect and a prompt trial. 
The decision in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), 
upholding brief preventive detention of juveniles, does not dis-
pose of this case. Though the governmental interest in protect-
ing the public is of high order whether the danger is posed by 
juveniles or adults, the Court in Schall pointed out "that juve-
niles, 'who unlike adults, are always in some form of custody,' 
id. at 265, have an interest in liberty less substantial than 
that of adults." Pet. App. 22a. In addition, CA2 stated that it 
disagreed with the decisions of others CAs that have upheld the 
constitutionality of pretrial detention on the ground of danger-
ousness (referring, without elaboration, to the reasons stated by 
Judge Newman in Melendez-Carrion). 
V.chief Judge Feinberg dissented. He noted that Congress 
enacted the preventive detention provision of the Bail Reform Act 
out of a deep concern with "'the growing problem of crimes com-
mitted by persons on release."' Pet. App. 24a (quoting Senate 
Report). In Schall, the Court concluded that the need to protect 
• 
- b -
the community was a "legitimate and compelling" government inter-
est that could constitutionally justify the pretrial detenti o n of 
juveniles. Although the liberty interest of juveniles is conced-
edly inferior to that of adults, the compelling societal interest 
in protecting the community does not vary with the age of the 
person detained, and if anything, is stronger with regard to 
adults who may have superior access to committing serious of-
fenses. "Accordingly, the government has advanced a legitimate 
and compelling reason for pretrial confinement of adults accused 
of crimes." Pet. App. 25a. Further, although due process dic-
tates that the government not pursue its goals through "conduct 
that shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
172 (1952), there is "nothing inherently shocking to the con-
science in using a predict ion of future er imi nal i ty to justify 
confinement." Pet. App. 26a. Although the statute may be uncon-
stitutional as applied if pretrial detention is so lengthy as to 
constitute punishment, the statute is constitutional on its face. 
3. CONTENTIONS: CA2' s holding directly frustrates Con-
gress' purpose in passing the Bail Reform Act. Congress enacted 
the pretrial detention provision in response to public concern 
over the "alarming problem of er imes committed by per sons on 
release." S. Rep. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1983). The 
Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that pretrial detention 
could raise constitutional questions, but concluded after serious 
analysis that "pretrial detention is a necessary and cons ti tu-
tional mechanism for incapacitating, pending trial, a reasonably 
identifiable group of defendants who would pose a serious risk to , 
- 7 -
the safety of others if released." Id. at 10. Congress included 
elaborate procedural safeguards for potential detainees, thereby 
attempting to strike a balance between the government's interest 
in protecting the public and the defendant's interest in retain-
ing freedom. CA2's blanket holding completely sweeps aside this 
effort by Congress to accommodate competing interests. 
CA2's holding is also in conflict with decisions by CA3 and 
CA7, that have rejected due process challenges to the Bail Reform 
Act's preventive detention provisions. See United States v. 
Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (CA3 1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 
758 (CA7 1985); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (CA3 
1986). See also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 
1981) (upholding D.C. 's preventive detention statute), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). This Court's review is necessary 
to resolve the conflict. 
On the merits, CA2 is wrong. First, federal statutes enjoy 
a presumption of validity, particularly where Congress has spe-
cifically considered potential due process objections. Second, 
due process essentially commands that a balance must be struck 
between an individual's liberty and the demands of organized 
society. In the er iminal context, th is balance "represents a 
necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty 
and the State's duty to control crime." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 112 (1975). There is no doubt that the state has a 
"legitimate and compelling" interest in protecting the community 
from er ime, and that future er iminal conauct can be predicted. 
Scpall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 264, 278-79. Thus, the use of 
- 0 -
pretrial detention in cases where no conditions will reasonably 
assure the safety of the community is neither an "arbitrary impo-
sition" nor a "purposeless restraint" on an individual's liberty. 
Pet. 15 (citations omitted). CA2, by concluding that pretrial 
detention on the basis of dangerousness is a~ se violation of 
substantive due process, has rejected any balancing of governmen-
tal and personal interests and its analysis thereby "conflicts 
with the approach consistently used by this Court in analyzing 
statutory restraints on liberty • " Pet. 16. 
This Court has upheld various types of pretrial detention. 
See Schall (Pretrial detention of juveniles); Greenwood v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956) (pretrial detention of potentially 
dangerous mentally incompetent defendant); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206 (1953) (indefinite detention of potentially danger-
ous returning resident alien). Thus, the use of pretrial deten-
tion to protect the public from particularly dangerous persons 
does not offend the "conce?t of ordered liberty" (Palko, 302 U.S. 
at 325). Indeed, CA2's contrary conclusion would lea1 to strik-
ingly anomalous results. A court could detain a mentally incom-
petent person or a street criminal who threatened a witness, but 
would have to release an intentionally vicious defendant who 
threatened the public at large. Substantive due process does not 
compel these incongruous results. 
4. DISCUSSION: The government presents two strong argu-
ments for granting review in this case. 'First, whether CA2's 
constitutional analysis is correct or not, its aecision strikes 
down a critical section of an act that is important in the admin-
• 
- y -
istration of criminal justice. Tn addition, CA2's holding clear-
ly frustrates the express goal of ~ongress in passing §3142(e) of 
the Bail Reform Act. The report of the Senate ~udiciary Commit-
tee, s. Rep. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983), character-
ized the pretrial detention provisions as responding to the 
"broad base of support for giving judges the authority to weigh 
risks to community safety in pretrial rel ease decisions" and the 
report stressed that "the Committee has given thorough consider-
ation to the issues which have arisen during the lengthy debate 
over pretrial detention." "I'he Committee concluded that the "im-
portant societal interest" in protecting the public from a "lim-
ited group of offenders" who are likely to commit additional 
crimes was sufficiently compelling to overcome the liberty inter-
ests of those individuals and to make those pretrial detentions 
appropriate and constitutionally valid. Id. at 7. CA2's deci-
sion directly rejects Congress' reasoning. 
Second, the SG argues that CA2's decision is in conflict 
with decisions by CA3 and CA7. CA2's ultimate result (striking 
down §3142(e)) is certainly in conflict with decisions from those 
two circuits, although neither of those courts has engaged in as 
complete a constitutional analysis on the substantive due process 
question as has CA2. In United Stat es v. Accetturo, 78 2 F. 2d 
382, 387-88 (CA3 1986), the substantive due process issue was not 
even raised. The defendants there challenged §3142(e) solely on 
the grounds that it failed to direct judges to consider the prob-
able length of pretrial detention that would be faced by defend-
ants. CA3 rejected that challenge on the ground that Congress 
- J.U -
legitimately chose to rely on the Speedy Trial Act to regulate 
the length of pretrial delays for both detained and undetained 
defendants. In United States v. l?errv, 788 F.2d 100, 112-113 
(CA3 1986), the defendants did present a facial challenge to the 
Act on, inter alia, substantive due process grounds. In a brief 
analysis, CA3 stated that in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 
(1972), the Supreme Court explained that its holding in Greenwood 
(1956) (allowing civil detention of individuals mentally incompe-
tent to stand trial) was based on the fact that such detained 
persons had been found to be dangerous : CA3 concluded that be-
cause the Bail Reform Act only permitted detention of "persons 
found to be dangerous in a very real sense (--] distributors of 
dangerous drugs and users of firearms in the commission of crimes 
of violence," there was no substantive due process violation. In 
United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 767-78 (1985), CA7 also 
engaged in a rather brief analysis of a due process challenge. 
The court did not use the term "substantive due process," but 
simply stated that pretrial detention to protect the community 
was not "punishment" in violation of the fifth amendment's prohi-
bition of punishment "'prior to an adjudication of guilt in ac-
cordance with due process of law."' 786 F.2d at 767 (quoting 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535). It therefore upheld the Act 
as facially constitutional. Thus, CA2's holding is in conflict 
with the results reache~ by CA3 and CA7, although the debate on 
substantive due process is certainly not as well formulated as it 
could be for purposes of this Court's review. 
- .L.L -
On the merits, I think this is a difficult question. In 
---.., 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979), the Court ex-
pressly left open the question whether, apart from the govern-
ment's substantial interest in ensuring that people accused of 
er imes are available for trial, "other governmental objectives 
may constitutionally justify pretrial detention." In Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), the Court had the opportunity to 
consider this question in the context of a New York statute that 
allowed for the pretrial detention of juveniles who posed a "se-
rious risk" of committing a crime before trial. ~he Court stated 
that there is a "'legitimate and compelling state interest' in 
protecting the community from crime," 467 U.S. at 264 (quoting De 
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)). It then went on to 
state, however, that the "juvenile's countervailing interest in 
freedom • . must be qualified by the recognition that juve-
niles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody ••• In 
this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be subordinated to the State's 'parens patriae 
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.'" 
4 6 7 u • s • at 2 6 5 ( c i tat ion om i t t e d ) • Thus, the Court did not 
choose to hold that the compelling governmental interest in pre-
venting future er ime was, by itself, sufficient to overcome an 
individual's liberty interest. 
Given this case law, CA2's analysis is not unreasonable. 
It agreed that providing protection against the occurrence of 
future crimes is an interest of high social value. Nevertheless, 
even according that objective the "highest value," CA2 could not , 
- ..LL. -
agree that the objective could constitutionally be achieved by 
incarcerating a person likely to commit crimes in the future. 
CA2 is correct that substantive due process would ordinarily 
prohibit incarcerating a person without a trial simply on the 
government's proof that the person is likely to commit future 
er imes. CA2' s conclusion that " [ t] he lodging of charges for 
alleged past crimes does not alter this concept of due process," 
Pet. App. 18a, is certainly not unreasonable. 
Regardless of the merits of CA2 's analysis, however, I 
still think the granting of cert is appropriate. CA2's decision, 
as noted above, does overturn a critical section of an important 
criminal law and directly undermines a express objective of Con-
gress. Moreover, al though one may ordinarily wish to wait for 
more circuits to address directly (and more thoroughly) the same 
substantive due process concern raised by CA2, that does not seem 
particularly appropriate here. In this case, it is important 
that the Bail Reform Act be applied uniformly, and CA2's decision 
itself will probably affect a number of important criminal deten-
tion cases. In addition, although CA2's analysis may be reason-
able, even in light of Schall, some of Schall's analysis could 
certainly support a reversal of the CA2 decision. 
There is no response, and therefore I recommend calling for 
one. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR with an eye to grant. 
September 2, 1986 Feldblum Opn in petn 
October 31, 1986 Conference 
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SUMMARY: Th ~ equests that the Court give expedited 'j 
consideration to U vernment's challenge tot~ ruling ~i 
that a provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 concerning 
------------pretrial detention is unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND: Resps are reputed leaders of organized crime. 
Resps were charged with various racketeering offenses and violent 
crimes. The Government sought pretrial detention of resps 
pursuant to Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
1 This motion was added to the previously listed petn for cert 
after the Conference List was circulated. This memorandum G~nlch~::o~;~~~~~ 14 Foo(~ 
- 2 -
18 U.S.C. {Supp. II) 3141 et~-, which authorizes detention of 
a criminal defendant if no release conditions "will reasonably 
assure • the safety of any other person and the community." 
The DC ordered resps detained on the ground that there was 
"overwhelming" evidence that, if released, resps would continue 
to engage in violent criminal behavior. 
Resps appealed to the CA 2. The CA 2 {Kearse and Newman, 
with Finberg dissenting) held that section 3142{e)'s 
authorization of pretrial detention based on a determination of 
future dangerousness was facially unconstitutional as a violation 
of substantive due process. The CA 2 stayed the issuance of its 
mandate to allow the Government to seek this Court's review. 
The Government promptly filed a petn for cert. After the 
court requested a response, resp filed an answer. The petn is 
scheduled for consideration at the October 31, 1986, Conference. 
Resps are still incarcerated subject to the DC's order of 
pretrial detention. Trial is scheduled to begin on January 19, 
1987, and is expected to last approximately four months. 
CONTENTIONS: In support of the motion to expedite the SG 
alleges that: {l) the CA 2's declaration that the pretrial 
detention provisions of the Bail Reform Ace are unconstitutional 
"presents a question of great importance to the administration of 
the criminal law;" (2) the CA 2's decision "has largely paralyzed 
the application of the Bail Reform Act's pretrial detention 
provisions within the Second Circuit;" {3) expedited 
consideration may be necessary to protect the Court's 
• 
jurisdiction because trial will commence in January and the case 
- ~ -
may become moot with the completion of the trial; and (4) resps 
do not oppose expedition. 
To facilitate the Court hearing the case in January 1987, 
the SG offers to file his brief within fifteen days of the 
Court's grant of cert. The SG suggests that resps brief be due 
30 days after receipt of its brief and that the Government file 
its reply brief one week before oral argument. The SG also 
suggests that all briefs be served "through the use of an 
overnight delivery service." This means that if the Court grants 
cert on Monday, November 3, 1986, the SG's brief will be filed on 
or about Tuesday, November 18, 1986, and resps brief would be 
filed by Friday December 19, 1986. Under this schedule the case 
could be scheduled for argument in January 1987. 
Resps have filed a response to the motion urging that the 
Court grant the SG's motion and expedite its consideration of 
this case. 
DISCUSSION: If the Court grants the petn for cert, it 
should also grant the motion to expedite. Resps' pretrial 
detention may become a moot issue with the conclusion of resps' 
trial. Therefore, the Court should adjust its schedule to allow 
it to complete consideration of the case before the conclusion of 
the trial. Expediting the case will (1) make it less likely that 
the case will become moot before oral argument, and (2) reduce 
the stress on counsel of simultaneously defending resps at trial 
in the DC and briefing and arguing the case before this Court. 
In addition, the reasons for granting cert (i.e., the importance 
of 'the issue, the existence of conflicts between the circuits and 
- 4 -
the possibility of further conflicts) also support expedition. 
Finally, expedition does not impose any hardship on the parties 2 
or the Court. Resps support petr's motion to expedite and the 
schedule recommended by the parties will not inconvenience the 
Court. 
CONCLUSIONS: If the Court grants cert, the Court should 
expedite the case in order to lessen the possibility that the 
issue of pretrial detention might escape review because resps' 
trial began and concluded before the Court heard oral argument. 
Even if expediti o n is not strictly necessary to avoid a question 
of the case becoming moot, (1) the importance of the issue, (2) 
the apparent confusion on the issue in the various circuits, (3) 
the parties willingness to expedite the case, and (4) the fact 
that expedition will not inconvenience the Court, all recommend 
that the motion to expedite be granted. 
There is a response urging that the motion be granted. 
October 27, 1986 Schickele 
2 Since the CA 2 stayed its mandate, resps will continue to be 
detained pending trial until, and unless, this Court denies cert 
or affirms the CA 2. Thus, expedition will not harm, and may 
benefit, resps. 
October 31, 1986 
Court .................................. . Voted on .............................. , 19 ..... . 
Argued ......................... .. .. ... , 19 .. .. .. Assigned ...... ... .... ...... .. .. .. .... , 19 ..... . No. 86-87 
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January 7, 1987 
SALERNO GINA-POW 
86-87 United States v. Salerno and Cafaro (CA2) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 
authorizes the pretrial detention of an indicted defendant 
if, after a hearing, a court finds upon clear and 
convincing evidence that "no release conditions will 
reasonably assure 
the community". 
the safety of any other person and 
In this case, CA2, in an opinion by Judge Kearse 
joined by Judge Newman, held that this section of the Act 
is facially unconstitutional as a violation of substantive 
due process. Judge Fineberg dissented persuasively. 
Some half a dozen other courts of appeals have 
addressed the same question, and concluded that the Bail 
Reform Act is not facially invalid. See P. 11, n. 8 of 
the brief for the United States. 
CA2 agreed that pretrial detention of a defendant is 
lawful where evidence indicated a likelihood that he would 
flee, and not be available for trial. CA2 reasoned, 
however, that it would be unconstitutional to hold a 
. 
I ' 
citizen in jail simply because there was evidence that he 
probably would endanger the safety of others. Of course 
the case before us is different. Here respondents, 
members of the Mafia, have been indicted, and the TC -
relying primarily on taped conversations - found clear and 
convincing evidence that the public safety would be 
endangered. 
Judge Fineberg persuasively dissented, and I am 
inclined to agree with him and with the SG's brief. 
I should add, however, that the briefs on behalf of 
respondent are well written, and present strong arguments 
at least on their face. In essence, they emphasize that 
the effect of pretrial detention is to "inflict punishment 
prior to a determinaition of guilt". This, of course, 
normally is a denial of due process. Respondents cite a 
good many of our cases that support this general truth: 
Bell v. Wolfish; Palko v. Connecticut, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, and others. I do not believe there is a case 
directly in point. Despite the force of respondents' 
arguments, I think the carefully designed Bail Reform Act 
is constitutional. It strikes a proper balance, at least 
this is my present tenative view, between the right of a 
person not to be incarcerated prior to a determination of 
gui 1 t and the need to protect persons and the community 
from the type of criminal conduct that has been so 
pervasive in organized crime. 
* * * 
Although I do not think this case is free from 
constitutional difficulty, I would be hesitant to 
invalidate the Bail Reform Act. The courts can adequately 
protect the rights of defendants by requiring clear and 
convincing evidence of danger to other persons. 
Unless my clerk has a different view, a very brief 
memo will suffice. 
LFP, JR. 
ral 01/13/87 
January 13, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno and Cafaro 
Apparently this case is not moot. The SG's reply brf. states 
that Cafaro has not been convicted of anything, although he has 
been "temporarily released" for medical reasons. The SG also 
states that Salerno has not been sentenced yet for his unrelated 
conviction, and is still--S-eing held under the precentive deten-
tion order at issue here. Reply brf. , at 1 n. 1. 
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Cert. to CA2 (Newman, Kearse, Feinberg [dissenting]) 
Wednesday, January 21, 1987 (4th case) 
Question Presented 
1. Is §3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which 
authorizes the pretrial detention of an indicted defendant if no 
release conditions "will reasonably assure •.• the safety of any 
ot.her person and the community," unconstitutional on its face? 
2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
If a person is charged with a ~ime of violence, an offense 
........... 
that may result in a life sentence or death, a serious drug-
related crime, or if the person has been convicted of such a 
crime and is charged with a felony, the prosecutor may move for 
preventive detention under 18 U .s.c. §3142(f) (1). The statute 
provides for an immediate evidentiary hearing. The defendant may 
seek a continuance of up to 5 days; the prosecutor may seek a 
continuance of up to 3 days; longer continuances are permitted 
for good cause shown. 18 u.s.c. §3142(f). At the hearing, the 
suspect may be represented by counsel; may present evidence on 
his own behalf; may cross-examine government witnesses; and may 
present evidence by proffer. Ibid. The statute specifies 
factors that the judicial officer must take into account in 
deciding whether to allow pretrial release. §3142(g). The 
judicial officer may order preventive detention only if he finds 
that no condition or combination of conditions of release will 
~ asonably assure the safety of the community. The order must be 
i,r supported by "clear and convincing" evidence, §3142 (f), and 
' 1/ accompanied by written findings of fact and a statement of 
reasons. §3142(i). 
§3145(b)-(c). 
The statute provides for expedited review. 
Resps were arrested on March 21, 1986, and charged in a 29-
count indictment with RICO violations, mail and wire fraud, 
extortion, and operation of illegal bookmaking and numbers 
operations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering 
activity, including two conspiracies to commit murder. The 
3. 
government conceded that neither defendant posed a risk of 
flight, but moved for pretrial detention to assure the safety of 
the community. At a two-day evidenti ary hearing before the DC, ff-<.~ -
the government submitted a detailed . proffer of evidence 
indicating the Salerno is the head of the Genovese family of the ~ 
New York Mafia, and that Cafaro is a "captain" in that family. 
The proffer indicated that resps used violence to monopolize 
illegal gambling activities, to operate a loansharking business, 
and to control labor unions. According to the evidence, Salerno 
could order a murder by uttering the single word "hit." Petn Sa. 
Cafaro conducted the day-to-day operations of the family and 
ordered the use of violence. 
At the hearing Salerno contended that the government's 
witnesses were unreliable because of their criminal activities 
and because they benefited from their cooperation with the 
government. Salerno also proffered the testimony of witnesses 
who would state that they did not consider him a danger to the 
community, and a physician's letter stating that he suffered from 
heart disease. Cafaro proffered no evidence, but argued that the 
r~ 
government's tape recordings of his threats of violence did not 
,...___------------------,+<c.,,,-/'~3 
prove that he had carried out any of his threats. -· __, 
The DC concluded that the government had shown by clear and ,V-<'... --convincing evidence that no combination of condi tions--such as -house arrest and an order not to commit crimes--would reasonably 
ensure the safety of the community. The DC found that the 
family's "illegal businesses, in place for many years, require 
constant attention and protection, or they will fail." and 
4. 
"business as usual" for resps "involves threats, beatings, and 
murder." Petn 6a. Resps asked the trial judge to review the 
pretrial detention order, but she concluded that de novo review 
was inappropriate, and found no new evidence warranting resps' 
release. 
/2--\J 
A divided CA2 panel reversetl-. Judge Kearse' s opinion, for 





relies upon the constitutional "1,,c..O 
not ~ -be imposed except upon ~-J.. shall 
that preventive detention ~ 
imperative 
conviction, 
punishment. Chief Judge Feinberg's 
~~ 
dissent reasons that the 
interest in protecting society from adult crime is, if anything, 
even greater than the interest in protecting it against juvenile 
crime. In his view, the procedures set out in the statute 
provide constitutionally adequate protection against erroneous 
deprivations of liberty. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Although this is a very important case, it does not appear 
to be an unusually difficult one for you. You agree that 
preventive detention serves a compelling government interest in 
preventing crime, and that a prediction of future dangerousness 
based on adequate procedures is not arbitrary. 
A. Mootness. The newspapers reported some 
Salerno, and possibly Cafaro as well, has been 
time ago that ~ 
k 
convicted and /-"' ··~ --== sentenced on other charges. None of the briefs discusses the 
possibility that this has mooted the case. 
subject of questioning at oral argument. 
This should be a ~ 
5. 
Id 
The controversy is one capable of repetition yet evading 
. Y\b h" review y t 1.s Court. Pretrial detainees are supposed to be 
brought to trial quickly to shorten the period of pretrial 
detention. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 280 ( 1984), the 
Court considered the New York courts' "liberal view of the 
doctrine of 'capable of repetition, yet evading review'" as one 
of several features of the New York law that satisfied the 
requirements of procedural due process. 
Resps, however, may not be able to satisfy the requirement 
of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), that there 
be a real and immediate threat that they will again be subject to 
preventive detention. Apparently there is no likelihood that 
Salerno, at least, will finish serving his sentence in the near 
future. It may be that resps wish to pursue an action for 
damages, although it seems clear that the officials involved 
would be immune. Perhaps resps have a sufficient interest in 
erasing the stigma that attaches to a judicial finding that they 
are dangerous to the community. Of course this does not seem of 
great importance now that they have been convicted. In any 
event, a decision on the constitutional issue would not affect 
any of the DC's factual findings. 
Resps may attempt to argue that a decision in this case will ~-----------------------------
have some effect on their application for release pending appeal ----------------------------
of their convictions. I doubt that such an argument has merit. 
Of course a person's protected interest in liberty is greatly 
diminished by conviction of a serious crime. Under the Bai 1 
Reform Act, moreover, the standards for release on appeal are 
6. 
much stricter than those for release before trial. A convicted 
person must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is 
not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of the 
community. Section 3143{b) (1). Resps also must show that the 
appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises "a substantial 
question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order 
for a new trial." Section 3143{b) (2). It is possible, however, 
that a Court decision invalidating the procedures at the pretrial 
detention hearing would be relevant to the procedures at a post-
conviction hearing. 
In sum, I think this case may be moot, although I await -- ...-
instruction from the parties at oral argument. It may be that 
this question, like other questions regarding bail, will be 
reviewable only if the Court hears and decides it with the 
greatest expedition. See Stack v. Boy le, 3 42 U.S. 1, 4 { 1951) 
{granting cert. and deciding merits at the same time). 
B. The Merits. 
1. Substantive Due Process. The point of departure is 
v:s'chall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 {1984), in which you joined CHIEF 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST' s opinion for the Court upholding a New York 
statute authorizing ~ trial de~ n of juv~ . The Schall 
opinion accepts as "axiomatic" the proposition that the Due 
Process Clause forbids punishment except upon conviction. See 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 {1979). Schall concludes that 
pretrial detention of juveniles is not punishment because it 
serves a "legitimate and compelling" government interest in 
7. 
protecting society from crime, and also serves to protect the 
juvenile from his own folly. The Court relied upon several 
features of the New York law: there is no indication in the 
statute that preventive detention is intended as punishment; the 
detention lasts no longer than 17 days; juveniles often, although 
not always, are detained in "halfway houses" rather than prisons. 
Moreover, every state and the District of Columbia authorizes 
some form of juvenile pretrial detention, thus negating the 
argument that the practice offends deeply-rooted traditions. 
This case is more difficult than Schall. (B:~aj society 
does not recognize a government interest in protecting sane 
adults from the consequences of their own folly. ~~he 
period of pretrial detention, though limited by the Speedy Trial 
Act, will often exceed the basic 90-day period established by 
that Act because much pretrial time is "excludable" under that 
Act. ~ al though pretrial detainees are segregated from 
prisoners, they are not placed in non-secure half-way houses. 
Fourth, preventive detention of adults is a relatively new 
practice, and is a departure from the traditional principle that 
a criminal defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty. 
Only five states in addition to the District of Columbia 
authorize preventive detention of adults. On the other hand, the 
,, "' ------ -
compelling interest in protecting society from crime is present, --------------------------------... _____________ _ 
and preventive detention is available only for the most serious 
crimes, and only on a showing that no lesser restriction is 
likely to be effective. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against --
a. 
constitutionality of preventive detention is made by Judge 1 . 
Newman. First, Judge Newman notes that detaining a person who is ~-- -not accused of any crime based on a prediction of 
- ~--------·------ ' 
dangerousness would violate due process, even though it also --------~·-------would serve the compelling government interest in protecting 
society. Judge Newman argues that this logically implies that 
detaining a person who is accused of a crime for the same reason 
is equally invalid. The probable cause determination required by 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), however, sets criminal 
defendants apart from other citizens. For one thing, it provides 
some evidence of dangerousness (because so many crimes are 
committed by recidivists). Moreover, as Judge Newman admits, 
arrest and indictment justify II some regulatory curtailment of ~ 
liberty. 11 Petn 19a. Suspects may be detained long enough to 
hold a pretrial hearing; afterwards they may be detained in order 
to ensure their appearance at trial, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 534 (1979), or to prevent them from tampering with 
witnesses. To be sure, these restrictions may be distinguished 
on the ground that they are all related to the crime with which 
the defendant is charged; however, they are also non-punitive 
restrictions on liberty imposed prior to conviction. 
It is difficult to maintain the position that preventive 
detention is constitutionally forbidden in all cases. For 
example, if it were known that members of 
organization would carry out bombing 
while awaiting trial, detention would seem to be justified even 
9. 
if it the terrorists were likely to appear for trial. Of course 
this example merely raises the social "costs" of pretrial release 
to a very high level. It is still possible to argue, as does 
Judge Kearse, that surveillance and an accelerated trial schedule 
are the only remedies. It is clear, however, that such remedies 
will be inadequate in many cases. 
On balance, I think a carefully circumscribed preventive 
detention statute, such as this one, is not so shocking to the 
conscience as to violate substantive due process. 
2. Procedural Due Process. In Schall, the Court concluded 
that "from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently 
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct." 467 
U.S., at 278, citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ). 
Of course there is a determination of probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing. The Bail Reform Act also provides the 
extensive procedural safeguards outlined above, and provides that 
the hearing shall be held promptly. Congress clearly was 
attentive to the need to provide procedural safeguards against 
erroneous deprivations of liberty. It is difficult to think of 
additional procedures that would provide a significantly 
different margin of safety for defendants. Indeed, resps' 
argument on this issue mostly confines itself to an unconvincing, 




Society has a strong interest in protecting itself against 
the relatively small number of criminals who commit a relatively 
large share of the serious crimes. Congress has enacted a novel, 
carefully circumscribed statute, based on extensive legislative 
i.---- ---
findings, with considerable potential for preventing crimes by 
this small group. In this situation the Court should hesitate to 
interpose a constitutional barrier to the legislative goal. 
I am concerned, however, that permitting preventive 
detention of competent adults is "playing with fire." A much 
more sweeping statute also would serve the public interest in 
protection against crime, and would no doubt receive great 
popular support. On this score, it is ominous that Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Japanese internment case, 
is cited several times in the briefs. Of course this Court sits 
to ensure that the legislature does not exceed constitutional 
bounds. In this area, fine gradations may make a constitutional 
difference. For example, the statutory "presumptions" of 
dangerousness, not at issue in this case, are troublesome and may 
warrant separate consideration in a later case. 
I recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of CA2. ---
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SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-87 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ANTHONY 
SALERNO AND VINCENT CAFARO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
· [February -, 1987] 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows a federal court to de-
tain an arrestee pending trial if the government demon-
strates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary 
hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure 
... the safety of any other person and the community." The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck 
down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional, 
because, in that court's words, this type of pretrial detention 
violates "substantive due process." We granted certiorari 
because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding 
the validity of the Act. 1 479 U.S. - (1986). We hold 
that the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements, 
and we therefore reverse. 
I 
Responding to "the alarming problem of crimes committed 
by persons on release," S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3 (1983), Con-
1 Every other Court of Appeals to have considered the validity of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional challenge. 
United States v. Walker, 805 F . 2d 1042 (CAll 1986); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 803 F . 2d 1102 (CAll 1986); United States v. Simpkins, U. S. 
App. D. C. - , 801 F . 2d 520 (1986); United States v. Zannino , 798 F . 2d 
544 (CAl 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F. 2d 100 (CA3), cert. denied, 
479 U. S. - (1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F. 2d 758 (CA7 1985). 
2 
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gress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail 
crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National 
Legislature's considered response to numerous perceived de-
ficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for 
sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail 
applications and the circumstances under which bail is 
granted, Congress hoped to "give the courts adequate au- 1 
thority to make release decisions that give appropriate recog-
nition to the danger a person may pose to others if released." 
S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3. 
To this end, § 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer 
to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section 
3142(e) provides that "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the 
provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of 
any other person and the community, he shall order the 
detention of the person prior to trial." Section 3142(f) pro-
vides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards. 
He may request the presence of counsel at the detention 
hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf, 
as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other 
witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer 
finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably as-
sure the safety of other persons and the community, he must 
state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his 
conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," § 3142(f). 
The judicial officer is not ·ven unbrid d d' retion in 
making the detention determina 10n. Congress has specified 
the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors 
include the ~ ature and seriousness of the charges, the 
~ bstantialityL the government's evidence against the 
arres~, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and 
the 'tfature and seriousness of the danger posed by the sus-
pect' s release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order 
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detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate re-
view of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c). 
Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were 
arrested on March 21, 1986, after being charged in a 29-count 
indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire 
fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling vi-
olations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering 
activity, including fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy 
to commit murder. At respondents' arraignment, the Gov-
ernment moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursu-
ant to § 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release 
would assure the safety of the community or any person. 
The District Court held a hearing at which the Government 
made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government's case 
showed that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese Crime 
Family of La Costra N ostra and that Cafaro was a "captain" 
in the Genovese Family. According to the Government's 
proffer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a 
court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated 
in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enter-
prises through violent means. The Government also offered 
the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert 
that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspira-
cies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging 
the credibility of the Government's witnesses. He offered 
the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a let-
ter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a seri-
ous medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the 
hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations 
as merely "tough talk." 
The District Court granted the Government's detention 
motion, concluding that the Government had established by 
clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combina-
tion of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the 
communit~, or any person: 
4 
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"The activities of a criminal organization such as the 
Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest of its prin-
cipals and their release on even the most stringent of bail 
conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many 
years, require constant attention and protection, or they 
will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recog-
nizes a strong incentive on the part of its leadership to 
continue business as usual. When business as usual in-
volves threats, beatings, and murder, the present dan-
ger such people pose in the community is self-evident." 
631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (SDNY 1986). 
Respondents appealed, contending that to the extent that 
the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention on the ground 
that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is 
unconstitutional on its face. Over a dissent, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. 794 
F. 2d 64 (1986). Although the court agreed that pretrial de-
tention could be imposed if the defendants were likely to in-
timidate witnesses or otherwise jeopardize the trial process, 
it found"§ 3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention [on the 
ground of future dangerousness] repugnant to the concept of 
substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total 
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future 
crimes." Id., at 71-72. The court concluded that the Gov-
ernment could not, consistent with due process, detain per-
sons who had not been accused of any crime merely because 
they were thought to present a danger to the community. 
Id., at 72, quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F. 
2d 984, 1000-1001 (CA2 1986) (opinion of Newman, J.). It 
reasoned that our criminal law system holds persons account-
able for past actions, not anticipated future actions. Al-
though a court could detain an arrestee who threatened to 
flee before trial, such detention would be permissible because 
it would serve the basic objective of a criminal system-
bringing the accused to trial. The court distinguished our 
decisio11 in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), in which 
86-87-0PINION 
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we upheld police detention pursuant to arrest. The court 
construed Gerstein as limiting such detention to the "'admin-
istrative steps incident to arrest."' 794 F . 2d, at 74, quoting 
Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 114. The Court of Appeals also found 
our decision in Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253 (1984), 
upholding postarrest pretrial detention of juveniles, inapp_o-
site because juveniles have a lesser interest in liberty than do 
adults. The dissenting judge concluded that on its face, the h 
Bail Reform Act adequately balanced the Federal Govern-
ment's compelling interests in public safety against the de-
tainee's liberty interests. 
II 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger 
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform 
Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable 
set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, 
since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine out-
side the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v. 
Martin , supra, at 269, n. 18. We think respondents have 
failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the 
Act is "facially" unconstitutional. 2 
Respondents present two grounds for invalidating the Bail 
Reform Act's provisions permitting pretrial detention on the 
basis of future dangerousness. First, they rely upon the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act exceeds the limita-
tions placed upon the Federal Government by the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, they contend 
that the Act contravenes the Eighth Amendment's pr?scrip-
2 We intimate no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act that are 
not relevant to respondents' case. Nor have respondents claimed that the 
Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular 
facts of their case. 
6 
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tion against excessive bail. We treat these contentions in 
turn. 
A 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides 
that "No person shall ... be deprived oflife, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... " This Court has held 
that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two 
types of government action. So-called "substantive due 
process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct 
that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 
165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 
325-326 (1937). When government action depriving a per-
son of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due 
process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair man-
ner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). This 
requirement has traditionally been referred to as "proce-
dural" due process. 
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive 
due process because the pretrial detention it authorize~ on-
stitutes impermissible punishment before trial. SeeYBell v. 
Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 535, an n. 16 (1979). The Govern-
ment, however, has never argued that pretrial detention 
could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court of J 
Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Re-
form Act is ~egulatory; 'n'ot penal} and we agree that it is. 
As an initia!maUer, themere fact that a person is detained 
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the govern-
ment has imposed punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 
537. To determine whether a restriction on liberty consti-: 
tutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, 
we first look to legislative intent. Schall v. Martin, 467 
U. S., at 269. Unless Congress expressly intended to im-
pose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction 
turns on "'whether an alternative purpose to which [the 
86-87-0PINION 
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restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alterna-
tive purpose assigned [to it]."' Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). 
We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on 
the regulatory side of the dichotomy. The legislative history 
of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not 
formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for 
dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 8. Con-
gress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solu-
tion to a pressing societal problem. Id., at 4-7. There is no 
doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legiti-
mate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, supra. 
Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in 
relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve. 
The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under 
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes. 
See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f) (detention hearings available if case 
involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is 
life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain 
repeat offenders). The arrestee is entitled to a prompt 
detention hearing, ibid. and the maximum length of pretrial 
detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the 
Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. (1982 ed. 
and Supp. III). Moreover, as in Schall v. Martin, the condi-
tions of confinement envisioned by the Act "appear to reflect 
the regulatory purposes relied upon by the" government. 
467 U. S., at 270. As in Schall, the statute at issue here re-
quires that detainees be housed in a "facility separate, to the 
extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sen-
tences or being held in• custody pending appeal." 18 
U. S. C. § 3142(i)(2). We conclude, therefore, that the pre-
trial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act i~-
lat.Q!Yjn nature, and does not constitute punishment before 
trial in violation of the ue rocess Clause. 
8 
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The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that "the 
Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the 
ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure, 
without regard to the duration of the detention." 794 F. 2d, 
at 71. Respondents characterize the Due Process Clause as 
erecting an impenetrable "wall" in this area that "no govern-
mental interest-rational, important, compelling or other-
wise-may surmount." Brief for Respondents 16. 
We do not think the Clause lays down any such categorical 
imperative. We have repeatedly held that the government's 
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate 
circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest. 
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's 
interest is at its peak, the government may detain individuals 
whom the government believes to be dangerous. See 
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948) (approving 
unreviewable Executive power to detain enemy aliens in time 
of war); Moyerv. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (reject-
ing due process claim of individual jailed without probable 
cause by Governor in time of insurrection). Even outside 
the exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compel-
ling governmental interests can justify detention of danger-
ous persons. Thus, we have found no absolute constitutional 
barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens 
pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v. Landon, 342 
U. S. 524, 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 
U. S. 228 (1896). We have also held that the government 
may detain mentall~nstable individuals who present a dan-
ger to the public, 'Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), 
and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand 
trial, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 . U. S. 715, 731-739 (1972); 
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). We have 
approved of postarrest regulatory detention of juveniles 
when they present a continuing danger to the community. 
Schall v. Martin, supra. Even competent adults may face 
substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of 
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our criminal justice system. If the police suspect an individ-
ual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral 
magistrate determines whether probable cause exists. 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Finally, respond-
ents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee 
may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight, 
see Bell v. W ol.fish, 441 U. S., at 534, or a danger to 
witnesses. 
Respondents characterize all of these cases as exceptions 
to the "general rule" of substantive due process that the 
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of 
guilt in a criminal trial. Such a "general rule" may freely be 
conceded, but we think that these cases show a sufficient 
number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action 
challenged here can hardly be characterized as totally novel. 
Given the well-established authority of the government, in 
special circumstances, to restrain individuals' liberty prior to 
or even without criminal trial and conviction, we think that 
the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the 
basis of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the 
same manner that we evaluated the laws in the cases dis-
cussed above. 
The government's interest in preventing crime by arrest-
ees is bo~ compelling. De Veau v. Braisted, 
363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). lnScfiall, supra, we recognized 
the strength of the State's interest in preventing juvenile 
crime. This general concern with crime prevention is no less 
compelling when the suspects are adults. Indeed, "[t]he 
harm suffered by the victim ~rime is not dependent upon 
the age of the perpetrator." Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at 
264-265. The Bail Reform Actotl984 responds to an even 
· more particularized governmental interest than the interest 
we sustained in Schall. The statute we upheld in Schall per-
mitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any 
charge after a showing that the individual might commit 
some undefined further crimes. The Bail Reform Act, in 
10 
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contrast, narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in 
which the government interests are overwhelming. The Act ) 
operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a 
spec1 c ca egory o extreme y serious enses. 18 . S. C. 
§ 31 on ess pee ca y n t these individuals 
are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the 
community after arrest. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 6-7. 
Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt to inca-
pacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious 
crimes. The government must first of all demonstrate prob-
able cause to believe that the charged crime has been com-
mitted by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a full-
blown adversary hearing, the government must convince a 
neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that 
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of 
the community or any person. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). While 
the government's general interest in preventing crime is 
compelling, even this interest is heightened when the govern-
ment musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already in-
dicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a de-
monstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow 
circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its 
greatest. 
On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's 
stron interest in liberty. We do not minimize the impor-
tance an fun ame tal nature of this right. But, as our 
cases hold, th~ , in circumstances where the gov-
ernment's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to 
the greater needs of society. We think th~ care-
ful delineation of the circumstances under which detention 
will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the govern-
ment proves by clear and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an 
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with 
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee 
from executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we 
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cannot categorically state that pretrial detention "offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Sny-
der v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934). 
"Given the legitimacy of the [government's] interest in pre-
ventive detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that deten-
tion, the remaining question is whether the procedures af-
forded . . . provide sufficient protection against erroneous 
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty. See ½t-1 athews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 335." Schall, supra, at 274. We 
think that the procedures enumerated in the Bail Reform Act 
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. As we 
stated in Schall, "there is nothing inherently unattainable 
about~ prediction of future criminal conduct." Id., at 278; 
see vfurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in judgment). Under the Bail Reform Act, the 
procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood 
of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further 
the accuracy of that determination. Detainees have a right 
to counsel at the detention hearing. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). 
They may testify in their own behalf, present information by 
proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who 
appear at the hearing. Ibid. These procedures ensure the 
accuracy of the information flowing to the decisionmaker. 
The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of 
determining the appropriateness of detention is guided by 
statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and 
the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, 
the history and characteristics of the putative offender, and 
the danger to the community. § 3142(g). By explicitly stat-
ing the relevant considerations, Congress has reduced the 
possibility that a judicial officer will order detention on facts 
not relevant to the government's compelling interest in pre-
venting danger to the community. The chances of an 
erroneous decision are further reduced by the Act's require-
12 
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ment that the government prove its case by clear and con-
vincing evidence, id., § 3142(f). Finally, the judicial officer 
must include written findings of fact and a written statement 
of reasons for a decision to detain. § 3142(i). This 
requirement, combined with the Act's prompt review provi-
sions, § 3145(c), provides for effective and immediate 
appellate review of the detention decision, further reducing 
the possibility of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. 
We think these extensive safeguards provide ample protec-
tions to arrestees subject to detention under the Act. The 
protections are more exacting than those we found sufficient 
in the juvenile context, see Schall, 467 U. S., at 275-281, and 
they far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited 
postarrest detention in Y.ferstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 
(1975). We think respondents "have failed to note any addi-
tional procedures that would significantly improve the accu-
racy of the determination without unduly impinging on the 
achievement of legitimate state purposes." Schall, supra, 
at 277. Given legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose 
of the Act and the procedural protections it offers, we con-
clude that the Act is not invalid under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
B 
Respondents also contend that the Bail Reform Act vio-
lates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals did not address this issue because it 
found that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We 
think that the Act survives a challenge founded upon the 
Eighth Amendment. 
The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by pro-
viding merely that "Excessive bail shall not be required." 
This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall 
be available at all. Respondents nevertheless contend that 
this Clause grants them a right to bail calculated solely upon 
considerations of flight. They rely on Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U. S. 1, 5 (1951), in which the Court stated that "Bail set at a 
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figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to 
ensure the defendant's presence at trial] is 'excessive' under 
the Eighth Amendment." In respondents' view, since the 
Bail Reform Act allows a court essentially to set bail at an 
infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight, it 
violates the Excessive Bail Clause. Respondents concede 
that the right to bail they have discovered in the Eighth 
Amendment is not absolute. A court may, for example, 
refuse bail in capital cases. And, as the Court of Appeals 
noted and respondents admit, a court may refuse bail when 
the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by 
intimidating witnesses. Brief for Respondents 21-22. Re-
spondents characterize these exceptions as consistent with 
what they claim to be the sole purpose of bail-to ensure in-
tegrity of the judicial process. 
While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safe-
guard the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of 
defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits the government from 
pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through 
regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dicta in 
Stack v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this 
argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider 
whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit 
all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in 
that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, 
the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly 
available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater 
than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at trial. 
The holding of Stack is illuminated by the Court's holding ? 
just four months later in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 
(1952). In that case, rema~ar to the present 
action, the detainees had b~nd held without bail 
pending a determination of deportability. The Attorney 
General refused to release the individuals, "on the ground 
that there was reasonable cause to believe that [their] release 
14 
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would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endan-
ger the welfare and safety of the United States." Id., at 529 
(emphasis added). The detainees brought the same chal-
lenge that respondents bring to us today: the Eighth Amend-
ment required them to be admitted to bail. The Court 
squarely rejected this proposition: 
"The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from 
the E~ s Act. In England that clause 
has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all 
cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be exces-
sive in those cases where it is p~ ail. 
When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, 
nothing was said that indicated any different concept. 
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress 
from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be 
allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases bail is 
not compulsory where the punishment may be death. 
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say 
all arrests must be bailable." Id., at 545-546 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Carlson v. Landon was a civil case, and we need not decide 
today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to 
Congress' power to define the classes of criminal arrestees 
who shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to con-
clude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive 
limitations on the National Legislature's powers in this area, 
we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Noth-
ing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible govern-
ment considerations solely to questions of flight. The only 
arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the 
government's proposed conditions of release or detention not 
be "excessive" in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to 
determine whether the government's response is excessive, 
we must compare that response against the interest the gov-
ernment seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus, 
when the government has admitted that its only interest is in 
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preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum 
designed to ensure that goal, and no more. Stack v. Boyle, i 
supra. We believe that when Congress has mandated de-
tention on the basis of a compelling interest other than pre-
vention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does 
not require release on bail. 
III 
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial isttie car fully limited exception. We 
hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited excep-
tion. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of 
arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after 
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individ-
uals or to the community which no condition of release can 
dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above 
must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to 
say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon 
that primary concern of every government-a concern for the 
safety and indeed the lives of its citizens-on its face violates 
either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Reversed. 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
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86-87 - United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iu;n-tmt (!J'ond of Urt 'J!utiftb .itaite 
11Ja:e4m¼lton. !9. <q. 211ffe'l' 
I 
February 18, 1987 
Re: No, 86-87-United States v. Salerno and Cafaro 
I 
Dear Chief: 
In due course I hope to file a dissent in this 
one. 
The Chief Justice 





February 19, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
I think this is a careful opinion that you can join without 
reservation. THE CHIEF JUSTICE has been careful to leave unde-
cided the constitutionality of the statutory presumptions of dan-
gerousness, as well as the possibility that the statute may be 
unconstitutional as applied, p. 5 n. 2. 
1. The "substantive due process" section (pp. 6-11) is well 
crafted. The opinion first concludes that preventive detention 
is not punishment. Pp. 6-8. In answering this question, the 
opinion looks primarily to legislative intent, but also considers 
the "incidents" of pretrial detention in rel at ion to the goals of 
Congress. This seems to me precisely the right analysis. The 
opinion notes the similarities between this case and Schall v. 
Martin, the juvenile preventive detention case, but does not push 
them too far. The most important part of the opinion, pp. 8-12, 
simply concludes that there is no impenetrable constitutional 
barrier to detaining sane adult defendants on the basis of danger 
to the community. The opinion notes that detention is permitted 
in a wide variety of circumstances. There is no question that 
the government's interest in protecting the community is legiti-
mate and compelling. The opinion reasons that the government's 
interest is "overwhelming" when the class of detainees is nar-
·:;\ ., 
page 2. 
rowed to those who are: (1) charged with committing a serious 
crime and (2) found to present a danger to the community, on the 
basis of clear and convincing evidence. Al though it may seem 
somewhat odd to say that these procedural restrictions result in 
a "super-compelling" government interest, I think this is the 
proper analysis. It does not require the Court to minimize the 
individual's 1 iber ty interest. More importantly, it suggests 
that preventive detention would be unconstitutional if the de-
tainee were not charged with a serious crime, or if his detention 
were not based on judicial findings of dangerousness after an 
evidentiary hearing. Of course the difficulty in this area is to 
place principled constitutional 1 imits on preventive detention. 
The opinion's approach suggests such limits. 
2. The "procedural due process" question is not difficult. 
As the opinion observes, it is difficult to think of additional 
procedural protections that would increase significantly the ac-
curacy of predictions of future dangerousness. 
3. CA2 did not discuss the applicability of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Although the Court need not address the question, it prob-
ably is wise to do so, to settle doubts about the facial consti--
tutional ity of the statute. The opinion does cut back signif i-
cantly on the statement in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951), 
that bail set higher than reasonably necessary to ensure the de-
fendant's presence at trial violates the Eighth Amendment. How-
ever, the opinion's discussion of Stack v. Boyle is quite fair. ~ 
The Court was not required to decide in that case whether bail 
, 
could be denied for reasons other than ensuring the defendant's 
page 3. 
presence at trial. The opinion does suggest, on pp. 13-14, that 
the Bail Clause never requires that bail be available, but only 
that bail not be excessive if it is available. You might con-
clude that this is too narrow a reading of the Bail Clause. The 
opinion expressly leaves this question open, however. I see no 
reason to ask for a language change, because you can easily dis-
sociate yourself from "mere dicta" in a later case if you wish. 
,-t: 
February 19, 1987 
86-87 United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
l?lease -join me. 
The Chief .Just ice 
l!p/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.jn.vrtntt <lfoud d lJtt ~Utb .jtzdt.G' 
Jlu!fittgtou, J. <If. 2.llp,., 
February 19, 1987 
Re: 86-87 U.S. v. Salerno and Cafaro 
Dear Chief, 
\ 
I had thought the only thing actually 
decided by CA2 and which we needed to address was 
whether "the total deprivation of liberty as a means 
of preventing future crime exceeds the substantive 
limitations of the Due Process Clause." 794 F.2d 64, 
72. I assumed we did not need to decide any 
procedural Due Process issue. Your opinion indicates 
"we think that the procedures enumerated in the Bail 
Reform Act satisfy the requirements of procedural due 
process." p.11. Because I have concerns about the 
procedural provisions of the Act, I plan to concur in 
the judgment and perhaps Parts I and IIB. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,ltpftutt <qaurl 1tf tltt ~nitn j;bdts 
,rag4ittghtn. ~. <If. 20~_,., 
February 20, 1987 
Re: 86-87 - United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
I shall wait for Thurgood's dissent. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMl!IERS 01' 
THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
~u.prtntt ~Dltri of tltt ~h .itafts 
~ufringhtn. ~--~- 2llc5~~ 
February 23, 1987 
Re: 86-87 United States v. Salerno and Cafaro 
Dear Sandra, 
I agree with you the only thing decided by CA2 in this 
case was whether any system resulting in confinement prior 
to trial was valid under the Due Process Clause, but I think 
the reason that that was the only question that they reached 
was because they concluded that no such scheme could be 
valid. Having come to the opposite conclusion, it seems to 
me perfectly logical that we should go on and evaluate the 
procedural guarantees contained in the statute, rather than 
sending the question back to the same panel of CA2 which 
declared the whole thing unconstitutional. 
I think it is important to have as strong an opinion as 
possible in a case like this, and I would hope that it would 
not be weakened by separate writing on the part of those who 
are in basic agreement any more than is absolutely 
necessary. If you have misgivings about any of the language 
in parts I and IIB, I would be happy to consider any 
suggestions that you have~ 
Since Byron and Lewis have already joined my draft, I 
am sending them copies of this letter. 




CHAMBER S Of" 
Jn.vrtutt ~ond ~ t41 ~ittb Jbdt.s' 
J}a.-frbtgton. Jl. ~. 2.llp,., 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
February 24, 1987 
Re: 86-87 U.S. v. Salerno and Cafaro 
Dear Chief, 
The Solicitor General stated several times during 
the oral argument that procedural due process issues were 
not to be resolved in this case. In my view there may be 
some procedural weaknesses and I am not prepared under the 
circumstances to express blanket approval for them. 
Your discussion of procedural due process begins 
with the first full paragraph on page 11 and continues until 
Part IIB on page 12. One suggestion, if you want to retain 
all of that discussion, would be to break it out as a 
separate subsection and I could join the rest of the 
opinion. 
An alternative suggestion would be to omit the 
first two full sentences on page 11, with the accompanying 
references, and the first full paragraph on page 12, and to 
insert on page 11 as a lead-in to the discussion of 
procedures something along the following lines: 
"This case does not raise the question 
whether the procedures of the Bail Reform Act 
provide sufficient protection against erroneous 
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty." See 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 335. Numerous 
procedural protections are built into the Act." 
... [insert the balance of page 11 to the end 
of the runover paragraph on page 12) Whether 
these procedures are sufficient given the serious 
liberty interest at stake, however, must be 
addressed in future cases." 
With changes along these lines I would be willing 
to join all of your opinion. In either event, I suggest the 
second to last sentence in the opinion be changed to refer 
only to substantive due process. 
I expect Nino and Harry may also suggest some 
changes. You may decide to wait until you have all the 
suggestions before considering any changes. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
I I ' 
.inprnnt (ijonrt of tlft~h .ibdts-
Jfuqinghtn. ~. <q. 2llffe~, ) 
March 2, 1987 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87. 
r 
There has been some discussion of the propriety of 
reaching the procedural due process issues presented by this 
case. The current circulating draft addresses the question, 
although the Court of Appeals did not pass judgment on this 
aspect of the case. I believe that it is entirely proper 
and indeed desirable to pass upon the fac·a1 validity of the 
mai.11 thrust o the Act, which in my view inc udes he 
procedural question. 
Initially, I believe that the Court of Appeals' 
majority opinion certainly hints at how that court would 
resolve the procedural issue. Admittedly, the majority 
opinion states rather unequivocally that "the total 
deprivation of liberty as a means of preventing future crime 
exceeds the substantive limitations of the Due Process 
Clause." 794 F. 2d 64, 72. The opinion also states that a 
program of incarcerating persons not accused of any crime 
"would be constitutionally infirm, not for lack of 
procedural due process," id., but because of substantive 
limitations. But the majority opinion is not entirely 
without reference to the procedural aspects of the case. 
For example, in countering the government's argument below 
that the mere fact of arrest would justify detention, the 
majority opinion states: 
"Moreover, if the arrest is thought to reflect that the 
person is more deserving of confinement than members of 
the public not accused of crime, the confinement would 
offend the procedural component of due process by 
dispensing with the procedural guarantees of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments that must be observed before past 




Chief Judge Feinberg was persuaded by the procedural aspects 
of the case, devoting a substantial discussion to the topic. 
The issue was E.- ly briefed y the parties in our 
Court. The governm nt devotes a ull fifteen pages to 
whether the Bail Ref - A~ strikes the proper balance 
between the defendant's liberty interest and the the 
government's interest in prevention of future crime. 
Respondents understandably devote eighteen pages to argument 
that the Act is invalid on procedural due process grounds. 
I think that the procedural issue, which I see as part 
and parcel of the general claim of unconstitutionality, was 
fully presented below and here. I do not find it surprising 
that the parties have devoted such energy to the prycedural 
issue, as this case is in the same posture as was/Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), when it came before us. There, 
the CA2 held that §320.5(3) (b) of the New York Family Court 
Act was unconstitutional as to all juveniles because the 
statute authorized punitive pretrial detention. See 467 
U.S., at 262. We rejected that substantive holding, and we 
also found that the law satisfied procedural due process, 
even though the CA2 had not explicitly reached that 
question. 
I believe that this case presents com ellin 
pass upon the facial validity oft e ct, broa ly 
There is certainly no jurisdictional bar to our 
consideration of the procedural issue, because we would have 
power to consider it even if it had not been raised below. 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443 (1984). Under these 
particular circumstances, considerations of judicial economy 
justify reaching this purely legal issue. Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743, n. 23 (1982). There is 
nothing that further development in the CA2 would do to aid 
our resolution of the procedural issue. Moreover, I 
believe that this is precisely the kind of case in which the 
Court should endeavor to resolve, if at all possible, the 
general validity of the Act. This is a question of obvious 
importance to federal law enforcement--a question that we 
saw as sufficiently weighty to justify expedited oral 
argument. Given the importance of the issue and the purely 
legal question before us, I think it proper and desirable to 
rule on all of the constitutional questions presented. 
If an opinion of this Court is to have any practical 
applicability at all, it must treat the intertwined 
su~stantive and procedural issues. A ruling that the Bail 
Reform Act satisfies substantive due process would be 
nothing more than a statement that under some undefined 
hypothetical circumstances, the government may detain an 
- 3 -
individual before trial on the ground of future 
dangerousness. Such a holding would provide absolutely no 
guidance to the lower courts regarding even the general 
contours of the circumstances under which detention would be 
valid. I believe the importance of this case lies not in a 
ruling that broadly states that the government is not 
completely disabled from effecting pretrial detention. 
Rather, it is crucial to state that the limited 
circumstances under which pretrial detention is available 
and the extensive procedures surrounding the detention 
decision are the factors that motivate our decision to hold 
the Act valid. 
Sincerely, 
• 
March 2, 1987 
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Dear Chief: 
I agree that we proper lv may reach the procedural due 
process issue. 
In my view, it fs 5mportant to do so. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/vde 
CHAM9ERS OF' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hJrttmt <1Jourl of tlft ~~ •ta.tte 
'1u~ ~- <1J. 2ll.;i~~ 
Re: No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
March 3, 1987 
I join your opinion. 
aural due process issues, 
expand on this. 
I am content to reach the proce-
although others may wish you to 
I have two minor concerns for your consideration. The 
first is the last sentence of the very first paragraph. It 
seems to me that when we say that the Act "fully comports 
with constitutional requirements," we imply that the door is 
closed against all possible challenges. In a sense that is 
somewhat inconsistent with footnote 2 on page 5. Could the 
sentence be softened somewhat so as to read, as a possible 
example, "We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted 
by these respondents, the Act •••• "? At least something 
along that line would be welcome to me. 
My second concern is a preference that the discussion of 
punishment v. regulation contain at least an intimation that 
if detention continues too long, it can become excessive in 
relation to the congressional goal and take on the attributes 
of punishment. Do you think that the insertion of a comment 
to this general effect would be useful? 
The Chief Justice 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1987] 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows a federal court to de-
tain an arrestee pending trial if the government demon-
strates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary 
hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure 
. . . the safety of any other person and the community." The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck 
down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional, 
because, in that court's words, this type of pretrial detention 
violates "substantive due process." We granted certiorari 
because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding 
the validity of the Act. 1 479 U.S. - (1986). We hold 
that, as against the facial attack mounted by these respond-
ents, the Act fully comports with constitutional require-
ments. We therefore reverse. 
1 Every other Court of Appeals to have considered the validity of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional challenge. 
United States v. Halker, 805 F. 2d 1042 (CAll 1986); United States v. 
Rodriguez , 803 F. 2d 1102 (CAll 1986); United States v. Simpkins , U. S. 
App. D. C. -, 801 F . 2d 520 (1986); United States v. Zannino, 798 F . 2d 
544 (CAl 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F . 2d 100 (CA3), cert. denied, 
479 U. S. - (1986); United States v. Pmes, 786 F . 2d 758 (CA7 1985). 
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I 
Responding to "the alarming problem of crimes committed 
by persons on release," S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3 (1983), Con-
gress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail 
crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National 
Legislature's considered response to numerous perceived de-
ficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for 
sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail 
applications and the circumstances under which bail is 
granted, Congress hoped to "give the courts adequate au-
thority to make release decisions that give appropriate recog-
nition to the danger a person may pose to others if released." 
S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3. 
To this end, § 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer 
to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section 
3142(e) provides that "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the 
provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of 
any other person and the community, he shall order the 
detention of the person prior to trial." Section 3142(f) pro-
vides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards. 
He may request the presence of counsel at the detention 
hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf, 
as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other 
witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer 
finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably as-
sure the safety of other persons and the community, he must 
state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his 
conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," § 3142(f). 
The judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in 
making the detention determination. Congress· has specified 
the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors 
include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the 
substantiality of the government's evidence against the 
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arrestee, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and 
the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the sus-
pect' s release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order 
detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate re-
view of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c). 
Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were 
arrested on March 21, 1986, after being charged in a 29-count 
indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire 
fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling vi-
olations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering 
activity, including fraud , extortion, gambling, and conspiracy 
to commit murder. At respondents' arraignment, the Gov-
ernment moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursu-
ant to § 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release 
would assure the safety of the community or any person. 
The District Court held a hearing at which the Government 
made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government's case 
showed that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese Crime 
Family of La Cosa N ostra and that Cafaro was a "captain" in 
the Genovese Family. According to the Government's prof-
fer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a 
court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated 
in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enter-
prises through violent means. The Government also offered 
the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert 
that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspira-
cies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging 
the credibility of the Government's witnesses. He offered 
the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a let-
ter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a seri-
ous medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the 
hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations 
as merely "tough talk." 
The District Court granted the Government's detention 
motion, concluding that the Government had established by 
4 
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clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combina-
tion of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the 
community or any person: 
"The activities of a criminal organization such as the 
Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest of its prin-
cipals and their release on even the most stringent of bail 
conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many 
years, require constant attention and protection, or they 
will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recog-
nizes a strong incentive on the part of its leadership to 
continue business as usual. When business as usual in-
volves threats, beatings, and murder, the present dan-
ger such people pose in the community is self-evident." 
631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (SDNY 1986). 
Respondents appealed, contending that to· the extent that 
the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention on the ground 
that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is 
unconstitutional on its face. Over a dissent, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. 794 
F. 2d 64 (1986). Although the court agreed that pretrial de-
tention could be imposed if the defendants were likely to in-
timidate witnesses or otherwise jeopardize the trial process, 
it found "§ 3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention [on the 
ground of future dangerousness] repugnant to the concept of 
substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total 
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future 
crimes." Id., at 71-72. The court concluded that the Gov-
ernment could not, consistent with due process, detain per-
sons who had not been accused of any crime merely because 
they were thought to present a danger to the community. 
Id., at 72, quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F. 
2d 984, 1000-1001 (CA2 1986) (opinion of Newman, J.). It 
reasoned that our criminal law system holds persons account-
able for past actions, not anticipated future actions. Al-
though a court could detain an arrestee who threatened to 
flee before trial, such detention would be permissible because 
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it would serve the basic objective of a criminal system-
bringing the accused to trial. The court distinguished our 
decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), in which 
we upheld police detention pursuant to arrest. The court 
construed Gerstein as limiting such detention to the "'admin-
istrative steps incident to arrest."' 794 F. 2d, at 74, quoting 
Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 114. The Court of Appeals also found 
our decision in Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253 (1984), 
upholding postarrest pretrial detention of juveniles, inappo-
site because juveniles have a lesser interest in liberty than do 
adults. The dissenting judge concluded that on its face, the 
Bail Reform Act adequately balanced the Federal Govern-
ment's compelling interests in public safety against the de-
tainee's liberty interests. 
II 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger 
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform 
Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable 
set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, 
since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine out-
side the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v. 
Martin, supra, at 269, n. 18. We think respondents have 
failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the 
Act is "facially'' unconstitutional. 2 
Respondents present two grounds for invalidating the Bail 
Reform Act's provisions permitting pretrial detention on the-_- -___ :__ · _ 
basis of future dangerousness. First, they rely upon the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act exceeds the limita-
tions placed upon the Federal Government by the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, they contend 
2 We intimate no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act that are 
not relevant to respondents' case. Nor have respondents claimed that the 
Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular 
facts of their case. 
6 
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that the Act contravenes the Eighth Amendment's proscrip-
tion against excessive baiL We treat these contentions in 
turn. 
A 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides 
that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... " This Court has held 
that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two 
types of government action. So-called "substantive due 
process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct 
that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 
165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 
325-326 (1937). When government action depriving a per-
son of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due 
process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair man-
ner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). This 
requirement has traditionally been referred to as "proce-
dural" due process. 
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive 
due process because the pretrial detention it authorizes con-
stitutes impermissible punishment before trial. See Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535, and n. 16 (1979). The Govern-
ment, however, has never argued that pretrial detention 
could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court of. 
Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Re-
form Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is. 
As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained 
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the govern-
ment has imposed punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 
537. To determine whether a restriction on liberty consti-
tutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, 
we first look to legislative intent. Schall v. Martin, 467 
U. S., at 269. Unless Congress expressly intended to im-
pose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction 
turns on "'whether an alternative purpose to which [the 
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restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alterna-
tive purpose assigned [to it]."' Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). 
We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on 
the regulatory side of the dichotomy. The legislative history 
of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not 
formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for 
dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 8. Con-
gress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solu-
tion to a pressing societal problem. Id., at 4-7. There is no 
doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legiti-
mate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, supra. 
Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in 
relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve. 
The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under 
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes. 
See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f) (detention hearings available if case 
involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is 
life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain 
repeat offenders). The arrestee is entitled to a prompt 
detention hearing, ibid. and the maximum length of pretrial 
detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the 
Speedy Trial Act. 3 See 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. (1982 ed. 
and Supp. III). Moreover, as in Schall v. Martin, the condi-
tions of confinement envisioned by the Act "appear to reflect 
the regulatory purposes relied upon by the" government. 
467 U. S., at 270. As in Schall, the statute at issue here re-
quires that detainees be housed in a "facility separate, to the 
extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sen-
tences or being held in custody pending appeal." 18 
U. S. C. §3142(i)(2). We conclude, therefore, that the pre-
trial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is regu-
3 We intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a particular 
case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in rela-
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latory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before 
trial in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that "the 
Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the 
ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure, 
without regard to the duration of the detention." 794 F. 2d, 
at 71. Respondents characterize the Due Process Clause as 
erecting an impenetrable "wall" in this area that "no govern-
mental interest-rational, important, compelling or other-
wise-may surmount." Brief for Respondents 16. 
We do not think the Clause lays down any such categorical 
imperative. We have repeatedly held that the government's 
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate 
circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest. 
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's 
interest is at its peak, the government may detain individuals 
whom the government believes to be dangerous. See 
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948) (approving 
unreviewable Executive power to detain enemy aliens in time 
of war); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (reject-
ing due process claim of individual jailed without probable 
cause by Governor in time of insurrection). Even outside 
the exigencies of war, we }).ave found that sufficiently compel-
ling governmental interests can justify detention of danger-
ous persons. Thus, we have found no absolute constitutional 
barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens 
pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v. Landon, 342 
U. S. 524, 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 
U. S. 228 (1896). We have also held that the government 
may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a dan-
ger to the public, Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), 
and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand 
trial, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 731-739 (1972); 
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). We have 
approved of postarrest regulatory detention of juveniles 
when they present a continuing danger to the community. 
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Schall v. Martin, supra. Even competent adults may face 
substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of 
our criminal justice system. If the police suspect an individ-
ual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral 
magistrate determines whether probable cause exists. 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Finally, respond-
ents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee 
may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight, 
see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534, or a danger to 
witnesses. 
Respondents characterize all of these cases as exceptions 
to the "general rule" of substantive due process that the 
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of 
guilt in a criminal trial. Such a "general rule" may freely be 
conceded, but we think that these cases show a sufficient 
number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action 
challenged here can hardly be characterized as totally novel. 
Given the well-established authority of the government, in 
special circumstances, to restrain individuals' liberty prior to 
or even without criminal trial and conviction, we think that 
the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the 
basis of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the 
same manner that we evaluated the laws in the cases dis-
cussed above. 
The government's interest in preventing crime by arrest-
ees is both legitimate and compelling. De Veau v. Braisted, 
363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). In Schall, supra, we recognized 
the strength of the State's interest in preventing juvenile 
crime. This general concern with crime prevention is no less 
compelling when the suspects are adults. Indeed, "[t]he 
harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon 
the age of the perpetrator." Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at 
264-265. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 responds to an even 
more particularized governmental interest than the interest 
we sustained in Schall. The statute we upheld in Schall per-
mitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any 
10 
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charge after a showing that the individual might commit 
some undefined further crimes. The Bail Reform Act, in 
contrast, narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in 
which the government interests are overwhelming. The Act 
operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a 
specific category of extremely serious offenses. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3142(f). Congress specifically found that these individuals 
are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the 
community after arrest. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 6-7. 
Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt to inca-
pacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious 
crimes. The government must first of all demonstrate prob-
able cause to believe that the charged crime has been com-
mitted by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a full-
blown adversary hearing, the government must convince a 
neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that 
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of 
the community or any person. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). While 
the government's general interest in preventing crime is 
compelling, even this interest is heightened when the govern-
ment musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already in-
dicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a de-
monstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow 
circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its 
greatest. 
On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's 
strong interest in liberty. We do not minimize the impor-
tance and fundamental nature of this_right. But, as our 
cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the gov-
ernment's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to 
the greater needs of society. We think that Congress' care-
ful delineation of the circumstances under which detention 
will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the govern-
ment proves by clear and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an 
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with 
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the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee 
from executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we 
cannot categorically state that pretrial detention "offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Sny-
der v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934). 
Finally, we may dispose briefly of respondents' facial chal-
lenge to the procedures of the Bail Reform Act. To sustain 
them against such a challenge, we need only find them "ade-
quate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some 
[persons] charged with crimes," Schall, supra, at 264, 
whether or not they might be insufficient in some particular 
circumstances. We think they pass that test. As we stated 
in Schall, "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a 
prediction of future criminal conduct." Id., at 278; see Jurek 
v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
Under the Bail Reform Act, the procedures by which a ju-
dicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness 
are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that 
determination. Detainees have a right to counsel at the de-
tention hearing. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). They may testify in 
their own behalf, present information by proffer or other-
wise, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hear-
ing. Ibid. The judicial officer charged with the responsibil-
ity of determining the appropriateness of detention is guided 
by statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature 
and the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evi-
dence, the history and characteristics of the putative of-
fender, and the danger to the community. § 3142(g). The 
government must prove its case by clear and convincing evi-
dence. § 3142(0. Finally, the judicial officer must include 
written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for 
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§ 3145(c), provide for immediate appellate review of the de-
tention decision. 
We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a fa-
cial challenge. The protections are more exacting than those 
we found sufficient in the juvenile context, see Schall, 467 
U. S., at 275-281, and they far exceed what we found neces-
sary to effect limited postarrest detention in Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Given the legitimate and com-
pelling regulatory purpose of the Act and the procedural pro-
tections it offers, we conclude that the Act is not facially 
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the ·Fifth 
Amendment. 
B 
Respondents also contend that the Bail Reform Act vio-
lates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals did not addres2 this issue because it 
found that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We 
think that the Act survives a challenge founded upon the 
Eighth Amendment. 
The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by pro-
viding merely that "Excessive bail shall not be required." 
This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall 
be available at all. Respondents nevertheless contend that 
this Clause grants them a right to bail calculated solely upon 
considerations of flight. They rely on Stack v: Boyle, 342 
U. S. 1, 5 (1951), in which the Court stated that "Bail set at a 
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to 
ensure the defendant's presence at trial] is 'excessive' under 
the Eighth Amendment." In respondents' view, since the 
Bail Reform Act allows a court essentially to set bail at an 
infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight, it 
violates the Excessive Bail Clause. Respondents concede 
that the right to bail they have discovered in the Eighth 
Amendment is not absolute. A court may, for example, 
refuse bail in capital cases. And, as the Court of Appeals 
noted and respondents admit, a court may refuse bail when 
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the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by 
intimidating witnesses. Brief for Respondents 21-22. Re-
spondents characterize these exceptions as consistent with 
what they claim to be the sole purpose of bail-to ensure in-
tegrity of the judicial process. 
While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safe-
guard the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of 
defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits the government from 
pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through 
regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dicta in 
Stack v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this 
argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider 
whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit 
all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in 
that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, 
the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly 
available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater 
than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at trial. 
The holding of Stack is illuminated by the Court's holding 
just four months later in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 
(1952). In that case, remarkably similar to the present 
action, the detainees had been arrested and held without bail 
pending a determination of deportability. The Attorney 
General refused to release the individuals, "on the ground 
that there was reasonable cause to believe that [their] release 
would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endan-
ger the welfare and safety of the United States." Id., at 529 
(emphasis added). The detainees brought the same chal-
lenge that respondents bring to us today: the Eighth Amend-
ment required them to be admitted to bail. The Court 
squarely rejected this proposition: 
"The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from 
the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause 
has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all 
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sive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. 
When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, 
nothing was said that indicated any different concept. 
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress 
from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be 
allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases bail is 
not compulsory where the punishment may be death. 
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say 
all arrests must be bailable." Id., at 545-546 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Carlson v. Landon was a civil case, and we need not decide 
today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to 
Congress' power to define the classes of criminal arrestees 
who shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to con-
clude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive 
limitations on the National Legislature's powers in this area, 
we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Noth-
ing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible govern-
ment considerations solely to questions of flight. The only 
arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the 
government's proposed conditions of release or detention not 
be "excessive" in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to 
determine whether the government's response is excessive, 
we must compare that response against the interest the gov-
ernment seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus, 
when the government has admitted that its only interest is in 
preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a -sum -
designed to ensure that goal, and no more; Stack v. Boyle, -
supra. We believe that when Congress has mandated de-
tention on the basis of a compelling interest other than pre-
vention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does 
not require release on bail. 
III 
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We 
', 
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hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited excep-
tion. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of 
arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after 
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individ-
uals or to the community which no condition of release can 
dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above 
must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to 
say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon 
that primary concern of every government-a concern for the 
safety and indeed the lives of its citizens-on its face violates 
either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Reversed. 
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Dear Chief: 
March 9, 1987 
✓ 
This is in response to your letter of this morning. If 
Sandra and Nino will join your proposed opinion, if the 
changes on pages 11 and 12 of the forthcoming third draft are 
adopted, I shall go along. I do so despite my hesitancy 
about prediction of future dangerousness (which you now men-
tion on the revised page 11). See my dissent in Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S., at 920. 
The Chief Justice 







~u.prtutt (!Iinui Df t1ft~b ~udts 
,rasqhtghtn. ~. (!I. 2llffe,., 
CHAM!!IERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 9, 1987 
Re: No. 86-87 United States v. Salerno 
Dear Byron, Harry and Lewis, 
Nino and Sandra have said they would join my proposed 
opinion for the Court in this case if I make the changes 
indicated in the last three paragraphs of part IIA. The 
enclosed revision makes those changes, and the result is to 
narrow somewhat the holding of that part of the opinion. 
While I think I preferred the original draft, I am happy to 
make these changes in order to get Sandra and Nino to join . (-
the opinion. I wanted to circulate them to you to see if 1c::;-they are acceptable to you before circulating to the v 








Ma ch 10, 1987 
86~87 United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to your letter of March 9, and the 
changes tn the last three paraqraphs of Part II-1t of your 
op:i.nion. 
Although I was happy with your opinion as original-
y cJrculated, the proposed changes are entirely acceptable 
to me. 
The Chief Just lee 
lfp/sn 
cc: Justice White 
Just ice Black mun 
Justice O'Connor 
Just ice Seal ia 
Slncerely, 
CHAMBERS or 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
Jitprtmt Qintt of tlf t ~ittb Jtatt• 
Jlulfiqton. JI. GI. 21t,,., 
March 10, 1987 
Re: No. 86-87 - United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
I would be pleased to join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM!SERS 0,-
,jnpuuu '4&rmt &tf t4t ~b .i\bdts 
1lhtsJtiugLm. '!J. (4. 2.0.?>l-' 
✓. 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87. 
March 26, 1987 
In connection with my research for the dissent in this case, 
I have been informed that in affidavits filed in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
dated March 18, 1987, the Government discloses that appellee 
Vincent Cafaro became a cooperating witness in September 1986. 
Furthermore, according to the affidavit of Warren Neil Eggleston, 
then the Deputy Chief Appellate Attorney in the Southern 
District, on October 8, 1986, "the Government consented to Mr. 
Cafaro's temporary release on bail." See Affidavit of Eggleston, 
110 (attached, emphasis added). This statement is difficult to 
reconcile with the statement in the Government's Reply Brief in 
this Court, filed January 12, 1987, that "Cafaro was temporarily 
released for medical treatment" but was "still subject to the 
pretrial detention order." Reply Brief, at 1-2, n.1. 
These recent disclosures by the Government in the Southern 
District suggest to me that there may not have been a live 
controversy in this case at the time of argument. If other 
Members of the Conference agree, I would be in favor of 
requesting the Clerk in the Southern District of New York to 
supplement the record here with the subsequent filings in the 
District Court. I also believe that a request for supplemental 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
-----------------------------------x 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
- v. -




STATE OF NEW YORK ) 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK : ss.: 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) 
AFFIDAVIT 
SS 86 Cr. 245 (MJL) 
WARREN NEIL EGGLESTON, being duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am now the Deputy Chief Counsel of the House of 
Representatives Select Committee To Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions With Iran. Until mid-January, 1987, I was an 
Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Rudolph W. 
Giuliani, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York. From February 1986_, until November 30, 1986, I was Chief 
Appellate Attorney, and from March, 1985 until February, 1986, I 
was Deputy Chief Appellate Attorney in Mr. Giuliani's Office. 
2. In mid-September, 1986, this office received 
confidential information that Vincent Cafaro, who then was 
incarcerated in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, wanted to 
talk to a representative of the Government. Because Mr. Cafaro 
was under indictment in the above-captioned case, I arranged for 
-------·· 
him to meet with an investigator from this Office who was not 
involved with the prosecution of this case to determine what Mr. 
Cafaro wanted to discuss. 
3. At that meeting, in mid-September, 1986, Mr. 
Cafaro told our investigator that he indeed had sent word that he 
wanted to meet with a representative of the United States 
Attorney's Office and that the subject he wanted to discuss was 
his potential cooperation with the Government. A day later, I 
met with Mr. Cafaro. He reiterated that he wanted to meet with a 
representative of this Office, but that he did not want his 
then-counsel to know about the meeting. We proceeded to discuss 
his possible cooperation and agreed to meet again. 
4. Because of Mr. Cafaro's status as an indicted 
defendant, I regarded it as advisable to erect a "Chinese Wall" 
within this Office, within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and, in large part, between this Office and the FBI in order to 
protect the right to counsel of Mr. Cafaro as well as of his 
co-defendants. I coordinated the execution of the steps 
necessary to protect those rights. 
S. Assistant United States Attorneys Alan M. Cohen 
and Mark R. Hellerer, who were prosecuting Mr. Cafaro, were 
informed that Mr. Cafaro had contacted us about the possibility 
of cooperation, but they were not told anything about the 
substance of our discussions with him. 
- 2 -
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6. During the early stages of our discussions with 
Mr. Cafaro, I informed Special Agent James M. Kessler of the FBI 
of the possibility that Mr. Cafaro would become a cooperating 
witness. As Coordinating Supervisory Special Agent of the 
Organized Crime Branch of the FBI's New York Office, Agent 
Kessler was, in my view, best suited to be the FBI's represen-
tative to advise this Office as our discussions with Mr. Cafaro 
proceeded. 
7. I advised Agent Kessler about the importance of 
preventing the transmission to the Assistant United State~ 
Attorneys or agents working on the prosecution of the above-
captioned case of any information that we might obtain from Mr. 
Cafaro, especially information obtained from defendants under 
indictment in the case. Accordingly, I instructed Agent Kessler 
to construct a Chinese Wall between the agents who were working 
on the Salerno prosecution and any agents whom he assigned to 
work with Mr. Cafaro. I advised Agent Kessler to tell all of the 
agents who would be working with Mr. Cafaro about the purpose and 
importance of the Chinese Wall and that as an additional precau-. 
tion they were to say nothing to the agents working on the 
Salerno prosecution about even the fact of Mr. Cafaro's 
cooperation. 
8. Agent Kessler advised me that Supervisory Special 
Agent Damon Taylor would be assigned to coordinate the debriefing 
and covert phase of Mr. Cafaro's cooperation. Agent Taylor assigned 
Special Agent Richard Dill to assist him iri the operation. I 
gave Agent Dill the same precautionary instructions I had given 
- 3 -
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Agent Kossler and directed Agent Dill to relay those instructions 
carefully to Agent Taylor. I further directed Agent Dill to 
instruct Mr. Cafaro not to relay to the FBI or this Office any 
information whatever concerning the defense strategy in the 
Salerno case. Thereafter, on several occasions, I personally 
met with Agent Taylor and gave him the same instructions. 
9. In late September, 1986, Mr. Cafaro was taken to a 
hospital for a medical examination with the Government's consent. 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cafaro secretly retained new counsel for 
the purpose of continuing his discussions with the Government 
and, after consultation with that new counsel, agreed to 
cooperate with the Government's investigation of Organized Crime 
in New York. As part of his understanding with the Government, 
Mr. Cafaro agreed to assist our investigation by working in a 
covert capacity and to testify as required. 
10. On October 7, 1986, the Government and Mr. 
Cafaro's new counsel together informed Judge Lowe of the possi-
bility that Mr. Cafaro would become a cooperating witness and 
that he had retained new counsel in connection therewith. The 
( following day, the Government consented to Mr. Cafaro's ~ emporary 
\ release on bail. 
11. In approximately mid-October, .Mr. Cafaro began to 
assist the FBI in its ongoing investigation of Organized Crime in 
New York. That assistance included meetings which Mr. Cafaro 
attended and recorded concerning possible criminal conduct other 
than that charged in the Salerno Indictment. 
- 4 -
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12. On numerous occasions thereafter, I met with or 
talked to agents of the FBI who were involved in the investiga-
tion and warned them about the continuing need to respect the 
Chinese Wall. 
13. Assistant United States Attorneys Alan M. Cohen, 
and Mark R. Hellerer were informed that Mr. Cafaro had agreed to 
cooperate and to participate in convert phases of the Govern-
ment's continuing investigation. At no time, however, did I 
reveal to Messrs. Cohen or Hellerer the substance of the 
information that Mr. Cafaro was providing or the nature of the 
covert work in which he was engaged. 
14. At the request of Assistant United States 
Attorneys Cohen and Hellerer, Mr. Cafaro was asked a series of 
specific questions about the charges contained and defendants 
named in the Indictment in this case. The purpose of asking 
those questions was to determine whether any of the defendants 
charged had not committed any the cr~es charged or whether any of 
the crimes charged had not occurred. Mr. Cafaro's answers fully 
satisfied me that the Indictment was an accurate and fair 
charging instrument. Agent Taylor so informed Messrs. Cohen and 
Hellerer. 
15. On October 20, 1986, the FBI informed me that Mr. 
Cafaro had been summoned by his Organized Crime superiors to a 
meeting concerning a criminal matter other than any of the crimes 
charged in the Indictment. One or more of Mr. Cafaro's indicted 
co-defendants were expected to attend the meeting. In addition, 
the meeting was scheduled to be held in the office of the lawyer 
- 5 -
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for one of the Salerno defendants, because the defendants had 
concluded that there was no other place where they could meet 
without violating their bail restrictions and thus risking 
revocation of bail and remand. After reviewing the pertinent 
caselaw, I advised the FBI that Mr. Cafaro could lawfully attend 
the meeting and record the conversation that occurred for the 
following reasons: a) the stated purpose of the meeting was for 
something other than to discuss defense strategy; b) non-defen-
dants were expected to be present as well as defendants; c) 
criminal activities other than those charged in the Salerno 
Indictment were expected to be discussed; d) Mr. Cafaro was 
ordered to attend the meeting; and e) perhaps most significant, 
the Government would not seek to offer at the trial of the 
Salerno Indictment any evidence derived from the meeting if 
prohibited by Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); 
Maine v. Moulton, 106 s.ct. 477 (1985); or United States v. 
Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1985). 
16. The meeting took place on October 28, 1986, at 
the law office of Robert Ellis; Esq., and the resulting con-
versation was recorded. The only indicted def:endants present 
were Vincent DiNapoli and Louis DiNapoli. After the meeting, I 
reviewed the recording that had been made. For all but the last 
few minutes of the conversation, the participants discussed his-
torical and ongoing crimes. No defense lawyers were present, and 
the conversation did not relate to defense strategy for the Salerno 
trial. At the very end of the meeting, the participants discussed 
vaguely whether any defendants might plead guilty in Salerno. 
- 6 -
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Mr. Ellis, counsel for Louis DiNapoli, then joined the meeting. 
In the presence of others, including unindicted individuals, Mr. 
DiNapoli posed some very general questions to Mr. Ellis about how 
the Government might be expected to proceed at trial if one indicte 
defendant (not one of the defendants at the meeting) chose to pleao 
guilty. Mr. Ellis speculated very generally in response that such 
plea would not materially alter the Government's proof at the trial 
of the remaining defendants. After listening to the conversation, 
I instructed the FBI agents to duplicate the tape up to the point 
at which Mr. Ellis joined the conversation and transcribe the 
conversation up to the same point. I further directed the agents 
to store the complete tape securely and not to disclose it to any-
one outside the immediate operational group. None of the prosecu-
tors or agents who are preparing the Salerno case for trial has ever 
heard or been told about the contents of that recorded conversation, 
and the Government will not offer it in evidence at the trial of 
this Indictment. ~ draft transcript of the conversation is 
submitted herewith for the Court's in camera review. 
17. In mid-November, 1986, Assistant United States 
Attorney Anne T. Vitale of this Office was informed that Mr. 
Cafaro was cooperating : with the Government and was engaged in a 
covert aspect of the investigation. Assistant United States 
Attorney Vitale was assigned to assist with that aspect of the 
investigation. Thereafter, in December, 1986, Assistant United 
States Attorney Howard E. Heiss of this Office also was assigned 
to assist in the covert phase of the investigation. Both were 
carefully instructed about the purpose and nature of the Chinese 
- 7 -
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Walls that had been erected and told not to reveal to Assistant 
United States Attorneys Cohen or Hellerer or to any of the agents 
working with Messrs. Cohen and Hellerer any information that came 
into their possession during their participation in the investi-
gation in which Mr. Cafaro was cooperating. 
18. As the operation proceeded, the participating 
agents kept me informed about meetings which had been held and 
about the substance of what had occurred. They also gave me a 
copy of the recordings made at the meetings, which I reviewed. I 
at no time revealed such information to Assistant United States 
Attorneys Cohen or Hellerer or to the agents helping to prepare 
the Salerno case for trial. I instructed the agents working on 
the ongoing investigation to do the same. At no time during my 
participation in this matter did I learn any information whatever 
about the strategy that the defendants may use in defending 
against the charges in this Indictment. 
Sworn to before me this 
18th day of March, 1987. 
WARREN NEIL EGGLESTON 
,dc.. 
✓ ----:=-=-=-::,-=..,,....,,..,,...------NOTARY PUBLIC 
_,_ ... • ... ... r . ····l · •. '.·,-:a, 
··1. · .'. , , .: •.. 
- 8 -
------ -~-........ , .... ._ ____ _ . __ ___ ,... ... _ .. . .., . -
CHAMaEIIB o, 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~,mt CIJouri of tlf, 1,luit,t .ttat,.-
1IU'lfiqton, )I. CIJ. 2D6'6J 
March 10, 1987 
No. 86-87 United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
CMAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:prtmt (!Jiturl itf t!f t ~uh ~httts-
~Mlfittgtcn. J. (!}. 2llffe", 
March 27, 1987 
Re: 86-87 - United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
✓ 
It seems to me that your memorandum of this date 
does not take into account the fact that we now know 
that the attorney who argued this case on the 
assumption that he could properly represent both 
Salerno and Cafaro may well have been unaware of a 
serious conflict between the interest of his two 
clients. There may be many reasons why he could not 
bring the facts in the Eggleston affidavit to our 
attention. It is also possible that the Solicitor 
General has not been advised of the relevant facts in 
view of the "Chinese Wall" that is repeatedly 
referred to in the affidavit. Although I am not 
disposed to set the case down for further briefing or 
argument at this point, it does seem to me that it 
may well be appropriate to invite the Solicitor 
General to comment on what appears to be a real 
possibility that the case is in fact moot. 
Respectfully, 
/ /L 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMISERS Of' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.ittpTtntt <!f ltUrl of tlyt ~~ ~Wt• 
,.-u lfmghtn. ~. (If. 20ffe )!. ~ 
~ ~/ 
J~~ 
March 27, 1987 
~~ ~U) 
Cl IM- f"'2.---HI--~ 0f ~ 
~-
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno 
I do not believe that there is a substantial question 
of mootness or collusion presented in this case. To my 
mind, it is not difficult at all to reconcile the affidavit 
circulated yesterday with the government's representations 
in this Court. The Solicitor General maintained that Cafaro 
was temporarily released. Reply Brief, at 1-2, n. 1. The 
affidavit of the former Assistant United States Attorney 
only confirms this: "the Government consented to Mr. 
Cafaro's temporary release on bail." Affidavit of 
Eggleston, 110 (emphasis added). We have no reason to 
disbelieve the Solicitor General's representation that 
Cafaro was and still is "subject to the pretrial detention 
order." Reply Brief, at 1-2, n. 1. 
I do not think that this speculation about Cafaro's 
cooperation with the government warrants our delving into 
the fine points of an ongoing criminal investigation in the 
Southern District of New York. Both the Solicitor General 
and Respondents' attorney have an obligation to inform this 
Court about developments that affect our jurisdiction to 
decide the case. Neither of these parties has made any 
representation whatsoever on this point. We are, after all, 
an appellate court, and not an investigative bureau. The 
Salerno case was properly presented to us, and I think we 
ought to decide its merits. 
Sincerely, 
Wv✓ 
March 30, 1987 
86-87 United States v. Salerno 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with your memo as to the status of th i.s 
case. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: 'l'he Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS 01" 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR . 
.ittpumt Oiouri of tfrt ~b ~tat.ts 
~u!fi:ttghtn. ~- (4. 2ll.;i'!' 
May 4, 1987 
No. 86-87 
United States v. Salerno 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
86-87 United States v. Salerno 
CJ for the Court 1/27/87 
1st draft 2/18/87 
2nd draft 3/5/87 
3rd draft 3/10/87 
4th draft 5/4/87 
Joined by BRW 2/18/87 
LFP 2/19/87 
HAB 3/2/87 
soc , 3/10/87 
AS 3/10/87 
TM dissenting 
1st draft 4/30/87 
2nd draft 5/6/87 
Joined by WJB 5/4/87 
JPS dissenting 
1st draft 5/20/87 
TM will dissent 2/18/87 
SOC plans to concur in the judgment and perhaps Parts I 
and IIB. 
JPS awaiting TM's dissent 2/20/87 
